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RECONSIDERING THE HISTORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.* University Press of
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth).
Keith E. Whittington
Somewhat surprisingly, there are still things to learn about
the history of judicial review. The practice might have started in
some obscurity, but for more than a century it has been at the
center of controversy. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the young constitutional historian, Edward Corwin, coined the
term “judicial review” to refer to the increasingly prominent
power of American courts to interpret and enforce constitutional
requirements against overreaching legislatures.1 Corwin was
himself an important contributor to an active political and
scholarly debate at the turn of the century over the origins and
legitimacy of the practice. In a time when politicians were prone
to warn judges that “the Supreme Court had usurped the power
to pass on the constitutionality of acts of Congress” and would
continue to exercise it only at the indulgence of Congress,2 Corwin
was among those who argued that judicial review was “the natural
outgrowth of ideas that were common property in the period
when the Constitution was established” and consequently as
American as apple pie.3 That early scholarship told us quite a bit
about how American courts began to exercise the power to declare

* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
1. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH.
L. REV. 643, 660 (1909).
2. Franklyn Waltman, Jr., Curtail Power of High Court, Lewis Advises, WASH.
POST, July 12, 1935, at 1.
3. Edward S. Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12
MICH. L. REV. 538, 538 (1914).
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statutes null and void and about the ideas and politics that gave
rise to that.
Late in his career, Corwin was also instrumental in solidifying
our canonical list of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has
struck down a provision of an Act of Congress as unconstitutional.
The Court itself does not keep track of such cases, and there was
a surprising amount of disagreement about how often the Court
had done so over the course of its history. With the Court playing
an obviously important role in announcing and enforcing limits on
legislative power, Congress decided that it needed a clearer
picture of the constitutional rules of the road. Corwin was well
suited to the task since he had already produced a popular text
designed to explain “the real constitution of the United States,”
the constitution as it “has come to be” through over a century of
judicial interpretation, rather than the brief document that
emerged from the Philadelphia Convention.4 After World War II,
Corwin was asked to provide Congress with an overview of the
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, including a list of cases
in which the Court had struck down a federal statute.5 The
Congressional Research Service continues to maintain today that
annotated Constitution and catalog of cases that have struck
down laws.6
While the scholarship of the early twentieth century
seemingly settled some issues about the origins and history of
judicial review, recent years have seen a renewed burst of
scholarly energy focused on the history of judicial interpretation
and enforcement of constitutional texts. We have gained new
insights into the English and colonial antecedents to American
judicial review,7 the activities of the courts in the early republic,8
the rise of judicial review in the states,9 and even the constitutional
decision-making of the U.S. Supreme Court.10 We have likewise
4. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (2d ed.
1921).
5. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 82-170, at 1241–54 (1952).
6. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/.
7. See, e.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION (2004);
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
8. See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER (2011);
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005).
9. See, e.g., JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2012).
10. See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
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gained better appreciation of the political and social contexts that
shape the exercise of judicial review and the development of
constitutional law.11
Repugnant Laws aims to tell us more about both how the U.S
Supreme Court has exercised the power of judicial review and
how politics has shaped the course of the development of
American constitutional law. For better or for worse, the book
does take a truncated view of how the Court has sought to enforce
constitutional requirements on elected officials. It excludes the
work the Court has done in monitoring state legislatures, which
has historically been an important and controversial part of how
the Court has exercised the power of judicial review. It likewise
excludes how the Court has enforced constitutional limits on the
discretion of lower court judges and of executive officers. As a
result, it does not provide anything like a comprehensive overview
of how the Court has construed the Constitution and sought to
preserve its commitments. Hopefully the tighter focus on how the
Court has addressed itself to Congress allows us to see greater
detail in what the Court has done in this particular area of activity
and to gain greater insight into the political relationship between
the Court, national partisan coalitions, and a powerful coordinate
branch of the federal government.
Although the book untangles the politics surrounding
various particular constitutional disputes and periods in time,
there are three broad issues of special concern. First, the book
reveals two centuries of judicial review that have largely been left
in obscurity. Second, it details the relationship between the Court
and national political coalitions and the extent to which the
justices have acted as allies of national political leaders. Third, it
lays the foundation for further thinking about the normative
difficulties surrounding the practice of judicial review.

RECONSTRUCTION (2011); LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND
RACIAL MINORITIES (2017); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS
(2004).
11. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009); THOMAS M.
KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY (2004); KEN I. KERSCH,
CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES (2004); KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING
ROOSEVELT ON RACE (2004); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008 (2009).
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THE LOST HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Everybody knows that the American courts exercise the
power to evaluate the constitutionality of legislation and declare
those laws that violate the Constitution to be legally void and of
no effect. To a surprising degree, it has been unclear how the
courts have exercised that power.
The problem started at the beginning. The U.S. Constitution
is clear about such basic governance issues as whether the
president has the power to veto bills, whether Congress can
override that veto, and how bills become law. The Constitution
famously does not say that the federal courts have the power of
judicial review; it merely says that the “judicial Power of the
United States” shall be vested in the Supreme Court and any
inferior courts that Congress might create. It is a myth that Chief
Justice John Marshall invented, created, or established the power
of judicial review in his 1803 opinion in the case of Marbury v.
Madison. Such a power was widely recognized in the years after
the American Revolution and had been exercised by numerous
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, prior to 1803. But
Marshall did provide a compelling account of that power, and his
opinion eventually became a touchstone for those seeking to
explain, justify, or criticize such a power.12
Since the Constitution did not specify that there was such a
power of judicial review, it also did not specify the form by which
it should be exercised. The Constitution specified that
presidential vetoes should be recorded in the journal of each
legislative chamber. The number of vetoes could be numbered
and counted. There is no such requirement when the courts strike
down a law as unconstitutional. When, in 1792, the second
Congress first heard the news from a constituent that a federal
judge had declared a federal statutory provision unconstitutional,
there was a brief debate over what kind of response might be
appropriate and whether a system needed to be put in place so
that the legislature would be promptly informed when such
12. On Marbury’s relative importance, see ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V.
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the
“Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2001); Mark A. Graber,
Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609
(2003); Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 51 (2003); Keith E. Whittington & Amanda Rinderle, Making a Mountain Out of a
Molehill? Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon, 39 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 823 (2012).
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actions were taken.13 But nothing was done. The courts made
decisions and issued opinions, but no one designated instances of
judicial review, reported such events to Congress, or put them
down in an official record.
After the constitutional centennial, the Supreme Court’s
reporter, Bancroft Davis, took it upon himself to compile a list of
cases in which the Court had struck down an Act of Congress as
unconstitutional, and included it in a historical appendix to a
volume of the Court’s opinions in 1889.14 The Davis list proved to
be controversial, and the historical debate over the incidence of
judicial review was politicized. Populists and Progressives argued
that the Court had rarely exercised the power of judicial review—
and thus should rarely exercise it in the future, since it was of
dubious legitimacy. Conservatives argued that the Court had
exercised the power of judicial review more often—and should
keep on exercising it in the future, to temper the passions of
popular majorities. Some argued that John Marshall created the
power of judicial review out of whole cloth and that the Court
rarely dared exercise the power afterwards. Some went further
and denied that even Marbury itself could properly be understood
as an example of judicial invalidation of a federal law. Others
argued that Marbury was just one of many instances of judicial
review and was just one example of a venerable judicial practice.15
The list that Edward Corwin put together for Congress in the
mid-twentieth century largely put an end to such debates. It gave
Congress a comprehensive catalog of the instances in which the
Court had struck down federal legislation in whole or in part, and
it provided scholars with a canonical statement of the incidence of
judicial review. It reflects our baseline understanding of the
history of judicial review, further refracted through lists of
canonical cases that seem particularly important for politics, law,
or teaching.16
The Corwin list is inadequate. The contours of judicial review
13. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 556–57 (1792).
14. 131 U.S ccxxxv–cclxiii (1889).
15. See, e.g., William Marshall Bullitt, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional
Legislation, 10 A.B.A.J. 419 (1924); Jackson H. Ralston, Judicial Control over Legislatures
as to Constitutional Questions, 54 AM. L. REV. 1 (1920).
16. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998); Tom Donnelly, The Popular Constitutional Canon, 27 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 911 (2019); William M. Wiecek, Is There a Canon of Constitutional
History?, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 411 (2000).
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as it has been practiced are not clearly identified with bright lines.
Corwin made implicit choices about what exactly he was going to
count as an instance of judicial review for this purpose. Corwin’s
own list went through permutations, as he added and deleted
cases until he settled on exactly what he wanted his list of cases to
convey. He might also have made some mistakes. There is good
reason to believe that his list is underinclusive of the total number
of instances in which the Court has refused to apply a federal
statutory provision because it transcended the boundaries of
Congress’s constitutional authority. Mark Graber, in particular,
has contended that Corwin underestimated the extent of judicial
review in the early republic.17 More obviously, Corwin (and his
predecessors) made no effort to identify all the cases in which the
Court had upheld a statutory provision against constitutional
challenge. We are left with a very one-sided impression of how
the Court has used its power to review the constitutionality of
federal legislation.
The backbone of Repugnant Laws is a new, hopefully
comprehensive, catalog of all the cases in which the U.S. Supreme
Court substantively reviewed the constitutionality of an
application of a provision of a federal statute, whether the result
was to uphold the statute against constitutional challenge or to
refuse to apply it due to some constitutional deficiency. That
dataset is now publicly available, along with a detailed
explanation of how it was assembled and how variables were
coded.18 The book and the dataset detail over 1,300 cases in which
the Court exercised the power of judicial review over Congress.
Hopefully, it will provide scholars with a resource for more fully
exploring the intricacies of how the Court has understood the
scope of congressional power under the Constitution and how it
has implemented that understanding over time.
Repugnant Laws seeks to put those cases in context and
unpack their significance, but it demonstrates that we have
underestimated the scope and extent of how the Court has
supervised Congress across its history. When resolving
constitutional challenges to congressional legislative authority,
17. Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional
Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73 (2000); Mark A. Graber, New Fiction: Dred Scott and
the Language of Judicial Authority, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177 (2007).
18. Judicial Review of Congress Database (https://scholar.princeton.edu/kewhitt
/judicial-review-congress-database).
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the Court has far more often upheld what Congress has done than
reined it in. In hundreds of cases, the Court has worked to expand
the scope of congressional authority and has endorsed
controversial exertions of federal legislative power. It has far less
often rejected components of federal law as being beyond the
reach of Congress. Even so, the Court has been far more active in
patrolling the boundaries of congressional power than our
standard list of judicial invalidations would suggest. All across
American history, including the first decades of the nation’s
existence, the Court has been willing to protect litigants from an
overreaching Congress. Some of those cases have been lost to
history because, unlike Marbury, they are obscure and politically
relatively inconsequential. Others have been overlooked because
the form with which the Court acted does not always match our
expectations from cases like Marbury. We gain a skewed
perspective on how the Court has actually exercised the power of
judicial review by remembering the most salient instances of the
justices striking laws down. Most of the constitutional work that
the justices have done does not look like that, but it is that more
routine marshalling of the judicial power to interpret and enforce
constitutional provisions that has helped build the modern
practice of judicial review.
THE COURT IN THE POLITICAL REGIME
A second interest of the book is in a set of empirical theories
about how courts exercise the power of judicial review. One set
focuses on the relationship of judges to their political
environment and the implications for the incidence of judicial
review and the substance of constitutional law. Another set
focuses on the political sustainability of judicial independence,
with judicial review being both an important by-product of
judicial independence and a sign of judicial independence.
The book is in part a contribution to what is sometimes
characterized as a political regimes school of judicial politics. As
Tom Keck has characterized it, this body of literature has
generally “traced the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to the
policy and political commitments of governing partisan
regimes.”19 Rather than thinking about judges as oppositional
19. Thomas M. Keck, Part Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics
Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 511 (2007).
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figures to the forces of democratic politics, this literature situates
judges within the broader political system where they are more
likely to work as partners or allies to a governing partisan
coalition.
The roots of this literature extend back to the foundational
work of Robert Dahl and Robert McCloskey in the mid-twentieth
century. Dahl was primarily a student of American political
behavior and was generally skeptical of the importance of
political institutions or constitutional forms in shaping political
outcomes or preserving a free society. His signal contribution to
judicial politics was to emphasize the role of the Supreme Court
as a partner to majority coalitions. As political appointees, the
justices could be expected to share the values and outlook of the
governing elites who shaped government policy in the legislative
and executive branches. In his examination of the history of
judicial invalidations of federal laws, Dahl concluded that the
Court had mostly been a passive bystander to federal
policymaking, with the New Deal experience of an activist Court
during Franklin Roosevelt’s first term of office being notable for
its exceptional, rather than its representative, nature.20
McCloskey was primarily a student of American political thought
and was more immersed in the constitutional jurisprudence of the
Court. Where Dahl was inclined to reduce the Court’s work to the
decision of whether to veto a policy adopted by a legislative
majority and to treat judges as just another set of policymakers
within a complex political system, McCloskey did not want to lose
sight of the extent to which the Court was not only “a willing,
policy-making, political body,” but also ultimately “a court.”21
Both tended to agree, however, that the Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence was shaped by and circumscribed by political forces
off the Court.
A more recent literature, which has built on those
foundations, has found that the judiciary’s role within the political
system is more complicated than the one imagined by Dahl and
McCloskey. Being an effective ally with a governing coalition
does not eliminate the possibility of independent and creative
judicial activity. Where Dahl expected to see a passive Court
deferring to the policy decisions made elsewhere, more recent
20. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
21. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 19, 21 (1960).
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scholars have found that judges have often been empowered by
their political circumstances. Elected officials and political leaders
have found positive uses for the courts, and majority coalitions
have often found themselves less organized, less harmonious, and
less confident than a simplified model of majoritarian legislative
lawmaking might suggest. There have been reasons for courts to
be full partners in national governance and not just passive
observers.22
Much of this recent work exploring regime politics has,
unlike Dahl, advanced through close observation of a small set of
case studies. Repugnant Laws attempts to return to Dahl’s own
favored ground, the full history of Supreme Court review of
federal legislation, to reconsider how the practice of judicial
review has fit within the ambitions and needs of electoral and
lawmaking coalitions. To what degree was Dahl right that the
overall pattern of judicial behavior is best characterized as one of
passivity? To the extent that the Court has been more aggressive
in actively deploying its power to nullify policies, has it done so
primarily from the posture of a transitional partisan opposition to
a newly ascendant political coalition? Although the Dahlian
perspective is useful in helping us think about how the politics of
judicial review has worked, it is misleading in guiding us toward
the specific expectation that an allied Court will have little to do.
The Court has been a meaningful player in American politics,
using the power of judicial review to advance a constitutional
vision that coheres with the interests and ideals of elected political
leaders, but doing so in ways that require limiting as well as
extending congressional authority.
A related but distinct empirical literature has been concerned
with how courts achieve and maintain some form of independence
from other political actors. Rather than taking judicial
independence as being achieved through the formal creation of a

22. For examples of the regime politics literature, see Cornell W. Clayton & J.
Mitchell Pickerill, The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP.
POL. 233 (2004); Howard Gillman, Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 644 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., 2008); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Mark
A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 229 (1998); Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the
Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321 (2007); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2009).
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judicial system with appropriate characteristics, such as a secure
tenure of office for individual judges, this literature takes effective
judicial independence as an empirical puzzle. How can a
politically weak institution like a judiciary exercise any real
power, and how can an independent-minded judiciary preserve
itself in the face of hostile political forces? Dahl’s implicit answer
is that it would not. Routine vacancies on a politically appointed
Court would insure that judges will remain within the orbit of
elected officials and not be inclined to act independently.
A more recent literature is more optimistic about the
possibility of a politically sustainable independent judiciary. A
politically dependent, independent judiciary can operate with
some degree of influence and autonomy, but only within bounds
and in limited circumstances. Judicial independence is something
that has to be achieved within the confines of an ongoing political
system, and it is not something that simply can be bequeathed or
inherited. An independent judiciary ultimately needs allies who
have their own reasons for supporting semi-autonomous courts,
and the political influence to help protect the courts when they
are at risk of being subverted. Much of that literature has
developed in thinking about courts outside the United States, but
the core insight that judiciaries are only powerful to the extent
that other powerful political actors have reasons to tolerate
judicial activity is as applicable to the American context as to any
other.23
Hovering over the history of judicial review is how the
United States Supreme Court has managed to build up the
practice of judicial review and sustain some measure of
independence and influence over time. As Court-packing is once
again in the air, it is perhaps more obvious now than it might once
have been that judicial independence is an ongoing political
project, and that the exercise of judicial review can only occur

23. For examples of the political judicial independence literature, see Frank Cross,
Judicial Independence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 557 (Keith E.
Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., 2008); John Ferejohn,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 353 (1999); William M. Landis & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); J. Mark Ramseyer, The
Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721
(1994); Georg Vanberg, Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 99 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., 2008).
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within bounds of political tolerance. Placing the Court within the
framework of American political development requires assessing
the sources of political support for the Court and significance of
the Court’s own actions for the larger flow of political events.
In showing how the Court has exercised judicial review over
time and placing the Court’s work in political context, we can also
begin to see how the Court has been able to sustain political
support for that practice. Although the Court has been quite
active in invalidating statutes across its history, it has rarely made
frontal assaults on core commitments of united political
majorities. The Court has generally stayed within the political
mainstream. In doing so, it has made adjustments on the margins
of public policy and exploited fissures in governing coalitions. But
when the Court has strayed too far into the political thicket and
found itself isolated from powerful allies, it has shown itself to be
vulnerable. The Court is allowed to gore some oxen, but it may
not strike down any sacred cows.
REVISITING THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN
DIFFICULTY
Finally, the history of judicial review provides more material
for thinking about the normative issues associated with judicial
review. Repugnant Laws is a work of political history, not
normative theory. But our normative theorizing about judicial
review should be informed by how the practice actually works,
which includes an appreciation of how the Court has realistically
exercised the power of judicial review and how the Court’s actions
have fit within a political context. It makes little sense to develop
normative theories regarding an idealized practice that is wholly
divorced from the historical reality or that proceeds on the basis
of assumptions that have little grounding in lived experience.
The hoary framing of the countermajoritarian problem
rested on a set of empirical assumptions about the workings of
American politics, as well as a set of normative values about how
political action could be justified. It has the advantage of being
intuitive and fitting an established narrative about judicial review.
When invalidating a statute, a court does no doubt strike down a
policy endorsed by a legislative majority, and such majorities are
themselves put in place through electoral victories. The Populists,
Progressives, and New Dealers all told themselves a story about
intransigent courts overturning the will of the people.
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There might be a kernel of truth in such narratives, and they
might account for some examples of judicial review, but this does
not seem like an adequate starting point for thinking about the
phenomenon of judicial review more generally. The political
regimes literature is sometimes read to suggest that, far from
being an antidemocratic institution, the Court is simply a
majoritarian one. That would seem to take things too far. The
Court might be tethered to elected political coalitions, but the
justices do not simply implement majoritarian policy preferences.
The Court is a political institution within a democratic political
system, but it is neither an immoveable barrier to the majority will
nor a simple instrument of electoral politics.
There are normative issues surrounding the practice of
judicial review, both as to how judges ought to exercise such a
power and how a power to set aside policies adopted by
democratically accountable assemblies can be justified. The actual
practice of judicial review shows the justices regularly rendering
politically controversial decisions that can find support in the
political movements that brought those justices to the bench. But
if the justices sometimes look distinctly Republican or Democrat,
conservative or liberal, they also routinely issue decisions that
cannot be reduced to partisan or ideological shibboleths. The
history of judicial review is a story of neither a democratic nor an
antidemocratic court, and compelling normative theorizing will
have to take into account the often complex and messy
relationship between the courts and the politicians.

